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 Paying people for their participation in 
research has long engendered controversy 
(1). Payments, some argue, can be an un-
due inducement that exposes participants 
to unnecessary risks and undermines the 
voluntary nature of informed consent. Al-
though some disagreement remains, these 
charges have now largely been refuted by 
both argument and data (2, 3). But what 
about the opposite: Is it permissible for re-
searchers to charge people to participate in 
research studies that of er some potential 
for clinical benef t?
Charging for research participation is 
not a new idea (4, 5). Certainly, many re-
search participants bear costs to participate 
in research, such as those related to travel, 
parking, and time of  of work (2). But both 
the magnitude of clinical trial–related costs 
and linking payment to enrollment make 
charging for participation dif erent. Previ-
ously, unscrupulous companies and health 
facilities have charged for research partici-
pation to increase prof ts (5, 6). Many of 
these companies went bankrupt (5, 6).
T e idea of charging research subjects 
for their participation has been resurrected 
primarily by clinical researchers who are 
understandably frustrated with the shrink-
ing budgets (in real dollars) of the U.S. Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) and other 
research sponsors. T ey propose to charge 
research participants as a way of funding 
studies that otherwise would not be con-
ducted because of limited resources.
One of us (E.J.E.) was asked to advise a 
group of academic investigators about the 
legality and ethics of charging for enroll-
ment in an early-phase clinical study de-
signed to assess the accuracy and ef  cacy 
of an experimental precision-medicine di-
agnostic test that might help target thera-
pies. T ese researchers—and others—ar-
gue that the lack of resources precludes the 
evaluation of potentially promising tests, 
drugs, and other interventions and that 
requiring payment from study participants 
might help support encouraging but cur-
rently unfunded and thus fallow research. 
T e clinical studies would otherwise fulf ll 
all of the traditional scientif c and ethical 
requirements: a valuable hypothesis, de-
tailed protocol, institutional review board 
(IRB) approval, informed consent docu-
ments and discussions, and commitment 
to disseminate all f ndings through scien-
tif c presentations and publication in jour-
nal articles.
Clinical and translational research is ex-
pensive. In the past, researchers have charged 
patients up to $35,000 for enrollment in 
a study and access to experimental inter-
ventions (5, 6). In the proposed precision-
medicine diagnostic study, researchers envi-
sion charging $20,000 to $30,000, depending 
on the estimated cost of the research.
Resource constraints in medicine and 
research are not new, but they are becom-
ing more severe. Currently, there are con-
strained collective resources, and patients 
are asked to bear an increasing propor-
tion of their medical costs through high-
deductible health plans and other mecha-
nisms. Consequently, it might seem natural 
to ask participants—who have the potential 
to benef t from research trials—to contrib-
ute f nancially to the costs of their research. 
T ere do not appear to be any clear legal 
or regulatory prohibitions on charging for 
participation in a research study. What are 
the ethical arguments for and against this 
practice?
Answering this question involves con-
sideration of the foundational principles of 
ethical research: collaborative partnership, 
social value, scientif c validity, fair subject 
selection, favorable risk-benef t ratio, in-
formed consent, and protecting the welfare 
of enrolled participants (7).
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF PAY 
TO PLAY
Advocates might marshal f ve main ethical 
arguments to support charging for partici-
pation in a research study. First, requiring 
payment for research participation could 
enhance collaborative partnership. Pay-
ing for participation is literally “putting 
your money where your mouth is.” Pay-
ment would be a real sign of participant 
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engagement—indeed, identif cation—with 
the particular protocol. What could dem-
onstrate partnership more than a personal 
f nancial investment?
Second, new sources of funding for clin-
ical research could enhance social value by 
supporting studies that otherwise might 
not be conducted because of resource con-
straints. As long as the research answers an 
important question, is conducted rigorous-
ly, and the results—positive or negative—
are disseminated, social value increases. 
T e more biomedical research is conducted, 
the more society learns about what drugs, 
devices, diagnostics, or other interventions 
work and do not work. Even research stud-
ies that produce negative results of er social 
value by revealing mistaken leads and redi-
recting resources to other more promising 
opportunities. As such, when it funds so-
cially valuable research, “pay to play” could 
be considered an act of charity—a donation 
for scientif c advancement. T rough dis-
ease-based charities, such as the American 
Cancer Society, or donations to academic 
research centers to fund professorships or 
specif c laboratories, people of en support 
biomedical research as a charitable contri-
bution. Participant-funded research simply 
represents a more direct way of funding 
research—an analog of the crowdfunding 
website Kickstarter (www.kickstarter.com) 
for clinical research. Indeed, when viewed 
as a charitable contribution, payment for 
research seems worthier than spending the 
equivalent amount on a luxury car, jewelry, 
or an exotic vacation. Supporting research 
that is socially valuable transmutes person-
al consumption into a charitable contribu-
tion that benef ts everyone.
T ird, having people pay to participate 
in research could a$  rm—perhaps even en-
hance—informed consent. It is likely that 
people who invest their own resources to 
participate in research will analyze in-
formed consent documents more carefully 
and thus better understand what they are 
getting into—and investing in (3, 8). Fur-
thermore, signing one’s name not just to an 
informed consent document but to a sub-
stantial check is a tangible a$  rmation of 
people’s voluntariness.
Fourth, there is a precedent for pay 
to play. Paying for research participation 
might not appear to be dif erent from ex-
panded access to experimental agents. 
Assuming certain conditions are met, the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
allows patients who have exhausted other 
therapeutic options to obtain experimental 
treatments even outside the conf nes of a 
clinical trial (9). In such cases, companies 
are permitted to charge the patients in or-
der to pay for the cost of the experimental 
drug or biological agent. Pay-to-play ar-
rangements, it might be argued, are no dif-
ferent.
Last, there is a liberty argument. It is 
widely accepted by ethicists and political 
theorists that people should have the free-
dom to do whatever they want with their 
own money as long as they are not harming 
others or diminishing their rights and op-
portunities. T is view is exemplif ed in so-
called “right to try” laws now passed in 22 
states. T ese laws are justif ed by the claim 
that terminally ill patients should be free to 
try—and pay companies for access to—ex-
perimental drugs not approved by FDA in 
the hope of f nding a cure. T eir decision 
might generate benef ts for themselves and 
harms no one else.
Such arguments might be extended to 
the research context as well. Requiring pay-
ment to participate in a research study that 
otherwise would not be conducted does 
not obviously hurt any other people, and 
those who do not wish to pay, or who lack 
the means, are free to decline. Af er all, no 
one has a right to unproven, experimental 
interventions. T us, as long as people vol-
untarily consent to pay for the opportu-
nity to participate in research, a parallel to 
right-to-try arguments based on personal 
freedom provides a strong rationale for al-
lowing them to do so.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST PAY TO PLAY
T ere are several arguments against per-
mitting payment for participation. First, 
pay-to-play research is less likely to be a 
collaborative partnership than a psycho-
logical exploitation of individuals desper-
ate to do anything to save their own or a 
loved one’s life (10). Although willingness 
to pay might indicate understanding and 
voluntariness by participants, it might also 
reveal unrealistic expectations and undue 
pressure. T e chances for success of early-
phase experimental drugs are much smaller 
than either researchers or laypeople think. 
T e vast majority of experimental agents, 
~90%, that enter human trials even under 
current circumstances fail primarily for 
reasons of safety and e$  cacy (11). A pay-
to-play model is likely to be used for early-
stage trials, as in the precision-medicine 
test trial mentioned above—precisely the 
types of studies that are least likely to ben-
ef t individual participants. In contrast, if 
the research is promising or has signif cant 
supporting data, the clinical research is 
more likely to gain external funding from 
either public or private sources. T e limit-
ed amount of data available for early-stage 
research trials also makes it di$  cult for po-
tential participants to assess their chances 
of receiving personal benef ts. Many people 
who would pay to enroll in such trials are 
unlikely to be familiar with the data that 
describe the potential benef ts and are thus 
likely to overestimate the chances of a suc-
cessful outcome (12).
More importantly, desperate patients 
are likely to feel pressured to pay for par-
ticipation, leading to biased decision-
making that raises questions about volun-
tariness. For example, parents feel tremen-
dous pressure to raise funds—perhaps by 
taking out a substantial loan or exhaust-
ing their retirement savings—to fund the 
participation of their ill child in a research 
study for a therapy they believe might be 
promising. Just because people can pay—
or raise— substantial sums does not mean 
they cannot be taken unfair advantage of, 
especially if their illness or that of a loved 
one compromises or biases their decision-
making (12). Typically, in such circum-
stances, society protects individuals from 
potential abuse.
In addition, collaborative partnership in 
research means that both sides are working 
toward a common goal of collecting gen-
eralizable data that can be used to enhance 
health. But as was observed in bone mar-
row transplantation trials for breast cancer 
(see below) (13), it is likely that the pay-
ing participants will be less willing to ac-
cept randomization to a placebo or active 
control arms—as used in some phase 1 
and 2 and most phase 3 clinical trials—and 
more likely to demand studies that benef t 
themselves. T is is less a collaborative part-
nership than a mutually benef cial transac-
tion—a business deal.
Calling pay to play charity mischarac-
terizes personal consumption of a good 
or service. Buying into a clinical trial ulti-
mately constitutes the purchasing of a good 
or service that happens to contribute social 
value as a side ef ect. Rather than charity, it 
is more analogous to buying an electric car, 
a choice that is clearly personal consump-
tion even if it has the positive externality 
of combating climate change. Pay-to-play 
research is also dif erent from a patient 
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who donates to a charity that supports re-
search. Typically, a donor does not fund a 
specif c research project or buy a spot in a 
study, and the intermediation of a founda-
tion or organization insulates researchers 
from pressure to enroll specif c individu-
als. More broadly, when contributing to 
charity, one typically does not expect any 
quid pro quo beyond acknowledgment or 
an expression of gratitude.
Paying for research participation might 
actually undermine social value and scien-
tif c validity by skewing research priorities 
or encouraging methodologically inferior 
research. Whatever its limitations, one of 
the critical functions of peer review is the 
comparative assessment of the worthiness 
and methodological rigor of alternative re-
search projects. Peer reviewers can evaluate 
the potential social benef t of research and 
prioritize longer-term but more benef cial 
projects. Pay-to-play funding would pri-
oritize research needs of the wealthy and 
their ailments. T ese priorities are unlikely 
to align with research that might be worthy 
but af  ict individuals without the means 
to pay, such as interventions for lead poi-
soning, tuberculosis, or schistosomiasis. If 
successful, pay-to-play research could also 
skew researchers and research institutions 
to pursue lucrative studies that are not 
necessarily socially valuable. T is might 
lead to a brain and facilities drain. Last, 
pay-to-play funding might enable studies 
that ask important questions but lack the 
methodological rigor to survive traditional 
peer review. At the extreme, pay-to-play 
arrangements might enable charlatans to 
pursue—and prof t from—f awed trials 
that of er no, or even negative, social value 
(4–6).
Another argument against paying for 
participation is fair subject selection. Mar-
kets distribute goods and services accord-
ing to one’s ability to pay. However, the 
selection of research participants should 
be based on the goals of the research study, 
including maximizing internal validity and 
generalizability, and on the obligation to 
minimize risks (7). Just as risky research 
should not target vulnerable groups, prom-
ising research should not be reserved for 
the wealthy or privileged (7).
In a 1998 article, the New York Times 
reported on the f rst antiangiogenesis fac-
tor undergoing clinical trials (14) and de-
scribed the biologic as a “cure” for cancer. 
T e next day, cancer centers conducting the 
phase I trial were besieged by thousands 
of people wanting to enroll (15). T ose 
centers did not select the well-connected 
and well-of  or auction of  the places on the 
study (15). A free society prohibits certain 
goods and services from being bought and 
sold or distributed on the basis of wealth. 
T e ability to vote and grades on tests and 
papers in college courses should be based 
on rights or merit, not distributed to the 
highest bidder. Similarly, in the United 
States, a person cannot legally buy an or-
gan for transplantation, purchase admis-
sion to the last bed in the intensive care 
unit, or buy a dose of a scarce vaccine in an 
inf uenza epidemic. Society is concerned 
about socioeconomic disparities in access 
to health care and health outcomes as well 
as in enrollment in research studies. Selec-
tion of participants for a research study by 
ability to pay violates fair subject selection.
In determining the risk-benef t ratio of 
a study, IRBs are supposed to consider psy-
chological, social, economic, and physical 
risks. For instance, the disclosure of medi-
cal information might lead to loss of a job 
or the inability to acquire disability or life 
insurance, which are risks of research par-
ticipation. In the context of pay-to-play ar-
rangements, the IRB would have to deter-
mine whether the potential direct benef ts 
and knowledge gains from the research jus-
tify the f nancial losses to participants that 
are associated with enrolling in the trial, as 
well as whether any risks could be justif ed 
if the study might not be able to recruit an 
adequate number of paying participants 
and therefore must be abandoned.
Pay-to-play arrangements also create 
challenges for the ethical implementation 
of a research study. Having a participant 
pay could lead to the bending of inclusion 
criteria, pressure on investigators not to re-
move participants from a study, and even 
inappropriate inf uences on decisions to 
terminate a study. For instance, it is not 
hard to imagine a pay-to-play participant 
pressuring a researcher to grant an excep-
tion to inclusion criteria and a researcher 
agreeing to do so because of the additional 
f nancial support. Similarly, patients with 
limited therapeutic options sometimes 
demand access to drugs even af er studies 
have proven them to be inef ective. Finally, 
the paying participants might be reluctant 
to fully disclose symptoms and side ef ects. 
Having invested substantial sums, partici-
pants may not want to acknowledge prob-
lems that might result in their exclusion or 
removal from a study.
In the past, attempts to rapidly expand 
access to promising but still unproven ex-
perimental treatments undermined the 
conduct and completion of research stud-
ies because patients were unwilling to ac-
cept randomization that might lead to their 
not receiving experimental treatments. For 
instance, in the 1990s, patients demanded 
access to bone marrow transplantation for 
metastatic breast cancer. T e treatment 
was unproven, but under pressure from pa-
tients, states passed laws to require cover-
age by insurers. T is dramatically impeded 
trial enrollment because patients wanted to 
receive the transplant and did not want to 
risk receiving the control treatment as part 
of a trial. Ultimately, trials showed that 
bone marrow transplantation for breast 
cancer, with its high morbidity and mortal-
ity rates, was no better than typically used 
chemotherapy. T e delay in completing 
the trial subjected many women to serious 
harm for no benef ts (13).
T e pay-to-play model has a high like-
lihood of undermining the research en-
terprise by (i) skewing the types of studies 
pursued as well as the amount of time re-
searchers and facilities devote to particular 
projects; (ii) exploiting potential human 
subjects; and (iii) compromising the meth-
odological rigor of clinical studies. T us 
it is not accurate to claim that no one is 
harmed by people’s exercise of their free-
dom. We are all harmed when the integrity 
of clinical research is compromised.
PROHIBITING PAY TO PLAY
Researchers are understandably frustrated 
with the diminishing support for clini-
cal trials and the increasing competition 
for limited research resources. However, 
charging people to participate in research 
is likely to undermine the fundamental 
ethical bases of clinical research (7), espe-
cially the principles of social value, scien-
tif c validity, and fair subject selection. Fur-
thermore, pay to play imposes unjustif ed 
f nancial harms on and raises the specter of 
exploitation of trial participants and their 
families. Researchers who of er the wealthy 
preferential access to places in research 
studies or who entice people to mortgage 
their homes so they can participate in 
clinical research take unfair advantage of 
people at a time when their judgment is 
potentially compromised.
T is specter carries with it a strong ethi-
cal presumption against pay-to-play clini-
cal research. Legislation or regulation to 
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prohibit pay-to-play clinical studies is war-
ranted to protect trial participants and the 
research enterprise. 
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